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Abstract
In the article How to Make Our Ideas Clear, published in 1878 by Popular Science Montly, Peirce presents 
his classical pragmatic maximum «Consider whatever effects, which could conceivably have practical 
consequences, we imagine inherent to the purpose of our conception». The conception of such effects 
establishes the whole of our conception of the object, pointing to a sense of intellectual meaning and 
differs from the idea of pragmatism in the current utilitarian sense at that time. Peirce did not mean that 
actions could be the purpose or the proper and adequate interpretation of any symbol (CP 5.402) provided 
that he was not in favor of life under the sole objective of the action detached from a rational thought or 
purpose (CP 5.429). Subsequently, between 1892 and 1893, his manuscripts The Law of Mind (1892), and 
Evolutionary Love (1893) provide the foundation in 1898, for the structure of the Habit, presented at the 
sixth and seventh Cambridge Conferences. In Habit, in 1898, Peirce argues about the one and the multiple, 
and the real character of the universal, pointing to the question that the principle of retroduction leads in 
the sense of pursuing the unity between the physical and the mental as much as possible. Consequently, 
establishing the conceptual link among concept, general idea, concept and habit for the constitution of the 
embodiment process of habits by the repetition of the general idea, or the composite idea, or the quality 
brought to consciousness. This article will bring the research in the cognitive scope of habit as a result of 
he repeated occurrence from the general idea brought to consciousness, introducing the terms «conception» 
and «concept» to achieve a rereading of the embodiment process of the habits by general ideas from one 
hand, and understand the general idea as the mark of habit (CP 7.498 1898). 
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in Habit Association (1898), C.S. Peirce (1839-1914) reflects on the process of generation of acomposite idea, or a general idea, distinguishing it from the meaning of the term concep-tion, that would not be an idea, but a habit, according to Peirce: «... the repeated occurrence 
of a general idea and the experience of its utility, results in the formation or strengthening of 
that habit which is the conception; or if the conception is already a habit thoroughly compacted, 
the general idea is the mark of the habit» (CP 7.498 1898).
This article intends to emphasize three questions presented in that text. The first question 
concerns the movement of uniformity in the formation of qualities, the second one refers to 
the attraction of ideas in the formation of general ideas as a mark of habit. The last question, 
on one side, as the general idea is linked to the suggestion of the conjecture and, on the other 
one, as the term conception, or habit, is linked to the hypothesis. 
Since 1868, in Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man, Peirce defines 
the concept of general idea as a mental action, still not specialized in the human mind (JORGE 
2004:112), understanding «cognition itself is an intuition of its objective element, which may 
therefore be called, also, the immediate object». What can be dreamed, thought, imagined is 
a subjective element of all cognition (see immediate object: CP 5,238 1868; apud PEIRCE, 
1995:250). In the same year, in Some Consequences of Four Incapacities, Thought-Signs, Peirce 
affirms that all cognitions contain general and vacant terms, allowing full interpretative self 
generation of the sign in another sign (CP 5,287 1868). There are characteristics of vagueness[1] 
and generality in the Thirdness, after all, the percipient fact involves continuity[2] and generality: 
the «generality of the Thirdness is representation of particular and will mediate the future action 
- action that will be given in a clipping of time and of space that characterizes the universe 
of individual of the Secondness» (IBRI, 1992:15). Peirce based on the Aristotelian definition 
of generality, that is: «is naturally apt to be predicate of many» (or «Quod aptum natum est 
praedicari of pluribus», CP 5,151 1903). In Three Kinds of Goodness, stretch Logical Goodness 
[1] Hookway emphasizes that (2000, 137: 149) Peirce laments the fact of the logicians to ignore the vagueness 
(5.446). The reality itself is irreducible vacant in general, base in the categorical analysis of the medieval ones, 
in specific, of Duns Scottus, points with respect to the direction of objective property of the vagueness concept. 
The vagueness is one of the three terms that are produced by means of the categorical analysis, or phaneroscopic, 
emphasizing the presence of three categories: Firstness or quality, spontaneity, vacant possibility, Secondness, or 
reaction, individual existence, and Thirdness, the category of intelligence, mediation, generality and intentionality. 
Vagueness is «the antithetical analogue of generality» (see 5.505). Claudine Tiercelin (2004: 12) says that the 
central idea of the logic of the vagueness in the Peircean workmanship is the fact of that no term is absolutely 
indeterminate; no term is absolutely determined. In the realistic scientific metaphysics of Peirce, there is emphasis in 
the irreducible indetermination of the Real: tendency to generalize and to acquire habits, the vagueness (Firstness), 
the «element of the spontaneity that inhabits in the base of the habit, and that we cannot verify, also is real (tichism, 
in the cosmology of Peirce)» (TIERCELIN, 2004: 16).
[2] On the process of continuous forms of time and space, Parker (1998: 121) complements saying that: 
aspects of the continuity are in everywhere. Any quality, any individual one appears in the way of a continuous 
process occurring in continuous forms of time and space. Peirce suggests that the process himself is understood 
by the mathematical model of one continuum that it makes possible the generation of definitive divisions. The 
«divisions» are places of the relative discontinuity, them «are marked» not by dimensional interruptions, but for it 
continues of reduced dimensionality (see CP 7.523 1898).
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(1903), Peirce will reiterate that the process of mediation is based upon the logical origin of a 
percipient fact, involving continuity and «not-relative generality»[3] (CP 5.149 1903). 
in Architecture of Theories, First, Second, and Third and also in The Law of Habit, 
(1891), Peirce contends that the movement of the law of habit sets out from disformity towards 
uniformity, i.e., diversity sprouts from a generalizing tendency, or a feeling generalization.
according to author:
The one primary and fundamental law of mental action consists in a tendency to generaliza-
tion. Feeling tends to spread; connections between feelings awaken feelings; neighboring 
feelings become assimilated; ideas are apt to reproduce themselves. These are so many 
formulations of the one law of the growth of mind. When a disturbance of feeling takes 
place, we have a consciousness of gain, the gain of experience; and a new disturbance will 
be apt to assimilate itself to the one that preceded it. Feelings, by being excited, become 
more easily excited, especially in the ways in which they have previously been excited. The 
consciousness of such a habit constitutes a general conception (CP 6.21 1891).
Thus, Thirdness[4] is the mediation that implies first the relation between quality itself, 
and second, the material universe (CP 6.32 1891). The association comes about as a natural 
disposal of mind and an acquired habit of the mind, the ideas are approached and associated 
in the experience (CP 7.498-499 1898).
in Objective Logic, Quale-Consciousness stretch (1898), in order to establish daily 
precognitive basis for the relations between subjective and objective up to dated in a system, 
human or not, Peirce had already developed the idea of unity[5] as quale[6]. Unity is an updated 
potentiality that generates quality from the nature of unawakened consciousness or quale-con-
sciousness (CP 6.236-37 1898).
[3] The idea of continuity and discontinuity goes through conceptual changes in four phases of Peirce´s workp, 
but it is relevant to stress that Peirce directs this question for the one of the infinitesimal ones on the continuum and 
the analytical true: Potter and Shields (1997) distinguish the stages of the idea of continuum in Peirce’s work: (1) 
up to 1884: based on the daily pre-Cantorian; (2) 1884 to 1894: based on the cantorian; (3) 1894 to 1908: based 
on the Kantian; (4) 1908 1911: based on one after-cantorian. Parker (1998: 241) remembers that Peirce, in his last 
two years of life, still writes on continuity.
[4] In the Thirdness there is a formal organizational principle, working as a law, i.e., a Peircean distinction 
would call Type, the formal principle that will generate some Replicas, or presentness, that allow retracing to the 
general principles.
[5] On the question of the reality of the universal ones, or the indetermination of ens reale, Peirce is based 
in Duns Scotus when admitting certain Metaphysical realities or formalities, which is not reduced nor the physical 
parts nor the conventional names, a time that its real unity, if in fact is discovered by the intellect, is not produced 
by it (CP. 8.18; 5.312), or an «absolutely indeterminate sign would designate a property which would have to be 
shared by all things. Hence we can form no conception of such a property» (CP. 1.548; L. 224). About uniformity: 
«The substances carrying their habits with them in their motions through space will tend to render the different 
parts of space alike. Thus, the dimensionality of space will tend gradually to uniformity; and multiple connections, 
except at infinity, where substances never go, will be obliterated» (CP. 1.416, 1890).
[6] The entitative, nomical generality (or subjective), divided by Ransdell (Santaella, 1995), is understood 
as a positive species and pertaining to the conditional necessity, peculiar to the category of law (CP 1.427 1896), 
while the qualitative is one of negative species, pertaining to the category of quality.
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Thus, «the element quale, that it appears inside as unity, which appears upon the inside 
as unity, when viewed from the outside is seen as variety» (CP 6.236 1898). According to Ibri 
(2001: 73): the «internal Secondness becomes categorically the correlate of the external phe-
nomenon reaction against consciousness similar to the correspondence between internal unity 
and external diversity, both under the first category».
In this text, Thirdness appears as a mediation between Firstness and Secondness, forming 
temporal synthetical consciousness, or experience of synthesis (CP 1.381 1890; see CP 7,536 
c.1908). The unity of quality is an idea and involves duality (CP 6,374-75 1901). In 1908, 
Peirce conceives the concept of continuity with the idea of uniformity, making a indelible and 
congenital bond between psychical and physical, or subjective and objective, since the idea of 
continuity is the idea of homogeneity, or uniformity which is a regularity: 
… in the same way a continuous line provides place for any multitude of points, [...] all 
regularity affords scope for any multitude of variant particulars; so that the idea [of] 
continuity is an extension of the idea of regularity (CP 7.535 c. 1908).
In the seventh lecture of a series of Cambridge Conferences (1898), specifically in Habit, 
Law of Mind (1892) (CP 6.102 and 163), Peirce had already said that the spreading of ideas 
occurs continuously, increasing its generalities for the formation of a continuum of conscious-
ness, and in so far as these ideas are fed, allowing creative evolution. The principle of continuity 
regulates cognitive process in which the consciousness is a continuous and «the self is a sign 
in a continuous semiotics flow» (CP 6.173 1901; KETNER, 1992: 37).
It can be emphasizes that assembling the already presented ideas, that unity in the scope 
of duality or Secondness brings up to date a generalizing tendency, movement of disformity 
towards uniformity, embodied by connections between feelings in the habits updating. The 
conception ability, to give birth (DIB, 2008:94 and 98), inherent to that tendency to grow 
while a nonabsolute evolutionary law of habit taking infers the uniformity which existed in 
that general absence of a particular law (CP 6.132 1891). Concerning the unity of conscious-
ness, Peirce says that if there is any continuity of feelings it is from the metaphysical nature 
of feeling to have a unity (CP 6.229 1898), also due to the action of habit for habit taking (CP 
6,613 1891). Unity of consciousness is a metaphysical and non physiological principle which 
occurs through the approach of ideas distributed by fortuitous actions, assembled in general 
ideas to make mental associations. It is the growth of Thirdness (CP 6,229 1898), that means 
the formation of hypotheses from the unity of percipient consciousness of an object, in the 
time (see JORGE, 2004: 208).
In another relevant point, Peirce says: ideas are attracted and approached by ideas, but 
they lose intensity and they gain generality, of some kind, what suggests a loss of intensity 
of that vagueness in potential, that is, «when one quality is brought vividly to consciousness, 
others will at once have their vividness increased, some more, some less» (CP 7.498 1898). 
Peirce suggests that the self generative process tends to reproduce in an inverse prism: there 
is a new gain of intensity, in some arising degree from that original vagueness that generates 
a field of attraction between similar ideas, after all, an idea can only be affected by an idea in 
continuous connection with it (CP 6.158 1892).
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In accordance with Hume, Peirce sterns that habits evolve from vagueness, originating 
an inference. Both authors define that habit implies repetition and propensity, it is an effect of 
the habit. Thus, whenever a repetition of some act or particular operation brings about a pro-
pensity to renew the same act or operation without any reasoning or process of understating, 
we say that this propensity is an effect of the habit (see JORGE, 2004: 208). If the general idea 
is the mark of habit, then, the propensity is the effect of a habit. This relation reminds us, for 
example, the Peircean definition about the present concept in The Law of Mind: 
...what is present to the mind at any ordinary instant is what is present during a moment in 
which that instant occurs. Thus, the present is half past and half to come (CP 6.126 1891).
The law of the action of the ideas is the great law of the mind, the generalizing tendency, 
the law of association, acquisition of habits and the formation of the concept, in its intellectual 
meaning: 
A concept is not a mere jumble of particulars, [...] is the living influence upon us of a 
diagram, or icon, with whose several parts are connected in thought an equal number of 
feelings or ideas. The law of mind is that feelings and ideas attach themselves in thought 
so as to form systems (CP 7.467 1893).
According to the meaning of general idea (JORGE, 2004:127), all symbol needs a special 
icon, or general idea, linked to a symbolic ingredient to mean (CP 7.498 1898). The function 
of the indicial ingredient of a symbol is to connect thought and general sign to a particular 
experience which has no power of meaning itself. Santaella affirms that «concept or meaning 
is a nonupdated habit and the general idea or icon is what updates the habit, engendering a 
signification. That is why Peirce often repeated that the symbol indicatess by means of a habit 
or an association of ideas», and added: «the general idea would be gestalt, an immediately 
perceived form or unity» (SANTAELLA, 1995: 174-175).
Peirce emphasizes the principle of inferential suggestion and, later the retroduction[7], to 
distinguish between material form and logical form (CP 5.194 1903), saying that inference must 
[7] At the beginning of its works, Peirce considered that all the inference forms could be reduced to the 
Barbarous silogism (CP 2.620), but the Peircean notion of inference are evolved for three distinct and irreducible 
types of the arguments or reasoning (CP 1.65). Peirce used the term retroduction as synonymous of abduction. 
According to it, retroduction, or «apagoge» for Aristotle, was wrong translated as abduction (CP1.65). Peirce defines 
retroduction as: «the provisional adoption of a hypothesis, because every possible consequence of it is capable of 
experimental verification, so that the persevering application of the same method may be expected to reveal its 
disagreement with facts, if it does so disagree» (CP 1.68). Peirce emphasizes this characteristic of the abduction 
using expressions, such as: «to fair guess», one «insight» extremely fallible, «not enough strong so that it is with 
more certain frequency wrong». Thus, retroduction does not propitiate security: a «with examination of hypothesis, 
and a muster of all sorts of conditional experiential consequences which would follow from its truth» (CP 6.470). 
Rescher distinguishes abduction from retroduction, the hypothetical-inductive research of the inquiry is divided in 
two phases: abduction as elaboration of provisory hypotheses of possible explanations for the solution of scientific 
problems, that is, in the retroduction there is a constriction of the possible alternatives and that one that in fact is 
correct it appears as efficient candidate, consists of the elimination of hypotheses on the observe basis given.
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be thought as an inference in its first suggestion after all «when an inference is thought of as 
an inference, the conception of inference becomes a part of the matter of thought. Therefore, 
the same argument which we used in regard to matter, in general, is applied to the conception 
of inference» (CP 5.194 1903, apud PEIRCE 1990: 231-232). In The Varieties and Validity of 
Induction (1905) about the link between suggestion and experience, Peirce says: 
... the stimulus to guessing, the hint of the conjecture, was derived from experience. The 
order of the march of suggestion in retroduction is from experience to hypothesis (CP 
2.755).
 If the example of abduction[8] is considered, we can understand that it shows the voca-
tion to dispose itself, according to Santaella, as «the tips of the inferences as mental actions, 
conceived as its opposition to the cartesian intuition...» (SANTAELLA 1993: 85). Therefore, 
in 1897, Peirce said: 
...pragmatism is correct doctrine only in so far as it is recognized that material action is 
the mere husk of ideas... But the end of thought is action only in so far as the end of action 
is another thought (CP 8.272). 
This sense of conception had already been mentioned in The Pragmatic Maxim (1893), 
when Peirce uses the expression «object of some conception», pointing to its characteristic 
of esse in futuro and he often uses the term concipere (CP 5.402, 1905; see CP. 5.2, 1901 and 
CP. 5.438, 1905).
In the ratio between final results and general ideas, in Wilhelm Wundt, Principles of 
Physiological Psychology (CP. 8.201), (1905), Peirce affirms that every action requires an end 
as a spirit of the principle: 
...which is that we must look to the upshot of our concepts in order rightly to apprehend 
them, would direct us towards something different from practical facts, namely, to general 
ideas, as the true interpreters of our thought (CP. 5.3, 1901-6).
in Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (1910), and previously in The Continuum, 
(1905), Peirce emphasizes that law is a live force and it is the mind that provides extensive 
thoughts in the time, by the possibility of mind junction of habits (CP. 6.490) that establishes 
genuine triadic combinations, after every thought is synthetic (CP. 6.174). Habits are formed 
under final causation and «that connection between feelings is determined by the general rule», 
allowing man the awareness of being governed by a general habit, or mental junctions, thus, 
the «intellectual power is nothing but facility in taking habits and in following them...» (CP. 
6.20, 1891).
[8] Santaella (1992: 90) says: «There are at least two articles that argue specifically on abduction, the apparent 
contradiction between logic and instinct» M. Ayim (1974) e L. Santaella Braga (1991).
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